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I. INTRODUCTION 
In MacDonald v. Moose, 1 a split panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to undo the state 
criminal conviction of an adult for soliciting oral sex from a minor.2 Based on 
Lawrence v. Texas,3 the court held a longstanding Virginia prohibition of 
bestiality and sodomy to be partially facially unconstitutional.4 Its decision left 
the bestiality prohibition untouched while holding the sodomy prohibition 
completely unenforceable, even as applied in cases involving minors.5 
The panel majority misapplied the deferential standard of review required by 
Congress for federal habeas review of state court convictions.6 And the court's 
analysis further muddled the already confused doctrine surrounding facial and 
as-applied challenges. More fundamentally, the panel majority's concern about 
the supposed need to engage in a "drastic" "judicial reformation" of Virginia's 
law to render it compatible with Lawrence was simply misplaced.7 The court 
could have-and should have-easily applied Virginia's law together with 
Lawrence, just as the Virginia courts did in the decade between Lawrence and 
MacDonald. 
'Associate Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. 
I. 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013). 
2. Id. at 155-56. 
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
4. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 166. 
5. Id. at 166-67. 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted 
unless the state decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented"). 
7. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 165-66 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006)). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
MacDonald v. Moose addressed the effect of Lawrence v. Texas on a 
Virginia statute criminalizing bestiality and sodomy. 8 William MacDonald was 
convicted in the Circuit Court of the City of Colonial Heights of soliciting a 
minor to violate Virginia's sodomy prohibition and contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor.9 At the time of the events giving rise to his prosecution 
(September of 2004), MacDonald was a forty-seven-year-old male and the minor 
was a seventeen-year-old female. 10 Putting aside the age difference for a 
moment and focusing just on the solicited act, MacDonald did not solicit what 
many people think of as a felony. He did not ask for help with robbing a bank or 
assaulting an enemy, but rather to perform oral sex. 11 Moreover, the minor said 
"no" and they did not then engage in oral sex. 12 It was only a few months later 
that MacDonald came to law enforcement's attention through an unusual 
combination of circumstances, and he was ultimately charged with and convicted 
of solicitation. 13 
MacDonald's solicitation conviction was based on two Virginia laws: (1) the 
law prohibiting solicitation of a minor to commit a predicate felony14 and (2) the 
law defining the predicate felony. 15 In MacDonald's case, the predicate felony 
was sodomy in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A): "If any person 
carnally knows in any manner any brute animal, or carnally knows any male or 
female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submits to 
such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony .... " 16 
Section 18.2-361(A)'s blanket prohibition of bestiality and sodomy was 
obviously unconstitutional in many of its potential applications after Lawrence. 17 
In Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the convictions of two adult men 
under a Texas law that prohibited sodomy between individuals of the same sex. 18 
8. Id. at 156, 160. 
9. Id. at 157-58. 
10. Id. at 156-57. 
11. Id. at 157 (citation omitted). MacDonald said he never asked the minor to perform 
fellatio on him, but a judge found otherwise in a non-jury trial. See id. at 157 & n.4. MacDonald's 
sufficiency of the evidence arguments failed, and they were not at issue by the time his federal 
habeas petition reached the Fourth Circuit. See MacDonald v. Holder, No. 1:09cvl047(GBL/TRJ), 
2011WL4498973, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 26, 2011), rev'd sub nom. MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 
154 (4th Cir. 2013). 
12. MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 157. 
13. Id. at 157, 158. One of these unusual circumstances was MacDonald's filing of a police 
report complaining that the minor had forcibly abducted him and sexually assaulted him. Id. at 157. 
Police interviewed her and credited her version of events over his. Id. MacDonald was also 
charged with filing a false police report. Id. 
14. Id. at 155 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-29 (2009)). 
15. Id. at 156 (citing VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-361 (2009)). 
16. VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-36l(A). 
17. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding unconstitutional convictions for adult, consensual, 
private, noncommercial conduct violating a statutory prohibition of sodomy). 
18. Id. at 562-63, 579. 
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The Court concluded that enforcement of the Texas law unconstitutionally 
invaded the protected liberty interests of adults engaged in private, consensual, 
noncommercial sexual behavior. 19 The Court in Lawrence asked "whether the 
petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of 
their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution."20 And the Court answered that the state cannot criminally punish 
"two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in 
sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle .... Their right to liberty 
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct 
without intervention of the govemment."21 
Lawrence did not guarantee constitutional protection for every sexual 
activity that comes within the sweep of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A). It 
would require a creative extension of Lawrence, for example, to find in that 
decision constitutional protection for someone who "carnally knows ... [a] brute 
animal."22 And the opinion for the Court explicitly limited its recognition of the 
constitutionally protected liberty interests at issue to adult, consensual, private, 
noncommercial sexual conduct: "The present case does not involve minors. It 
does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve 
public conduct or prostitution."23 
After Lawrence, then, an important question that arose for laws like section 
18.2-36 l(A) of the Virginia Code was whether such laws could constitutionally 
be enforced in circumstances that would not trespass on the personal liberty 
interests recognized in Lawrence. Virginia's courts said "yes" in MacDonald's 
case and others. 
In the state appellate court decision at issue in MacDonald's federal habeas 
pet1t10n, the Virginia Court of Appeals analyzed MacDonald's 
unconstitutionality-based defense as presenting both a facial and an as-applied 
challenge.24 The court rejected both. It grounded its reasoning on an earlier 
appellate opinion that affirmed MacDonald's convictions for four counts of 
sodomy arising out of a different prosecution in a different jurisdiction. 25 
19. Id. at 578. 
20. Id. at 564. 
21. Id. at 578. 
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36l(A). For a somewhat whimsical overview of how such an 
argument might proceed, see Eugene Kontorovich, The Bestiality Brief, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Dec. 5, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/12/05/zoophilia-sex-toys-and-the-
consitutional-protection-of-autonomous-sex/. 
23. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
24. MacDonald v. Commonwealth, Rec. No. 1939-05-02, 2007 WL 43635, at *l (Va. Ct. 
App. Jan. 9, 2007). 
25. Id.; see also McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 755-56 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
The sodomy prosecution was in Prince George County, while the solicitation prosecution was in the 
City of Colonial Heights. MacDonald, 2007 WL 43635; McDonald, 630 S.E.2d 754. The sodomy 
prosecution was based on four incidents between December 2002 and August 2004. McDonald, 
630 S.E.2d at 755. Two of the incidents involved the same seventeen-year-old female whose 
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In that earlier opinion, the Virginia Court of Appeals first rejected 
MacDonald's facial challenge on the ground that "a party has standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it has an adverse 
impact on his own rights."26 The court then rejected MacDonald's as-applied 
challenge on the ground that "Lawrence made quite clear that its ruling did not 
apply to sexual acts involving children."27 
In holding that Lawrence provides no constitutional protection for sodomy 
involving an adult and a minor, the Virginia Court of Appeals explained that 
Lawrence's inapplicability to "acts involving minors" was one of four exceptions 
to the Lawrence Court's holding: "The Supreme Court found that acts involving 
minors along with non-consensual acts, public conduct, and prostitution do not 
merit due process protection."28 And the court relied on Martin v. Zihert29 -a 
post-Lawrence decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia that held Virginia's 
fornication statute unconstitutional-while also noting that "this case does not 
involve minors, non-consensual act1v1ty, prostitution or public 
activity. . . . [S]tate regulation of that type of activity might support a different 
result."30 The court further noted its own prior use of "the exceptions noted in 
Lawrence to uphold the constitutionality of Code [section] 18.2-361(A) in other 
settings," namely "in affirming the conviction of a man accused of public 
sodomy based on the public acts exception in Lawrence."31 Finally, the court 
observed that "[ o ]ther jurisdictions have found these stated exceptions to be 
situations where the behavior is not a protected liberty interest."32 
After exhausting available appellate and post-conviction review in state 
court, MacDonald petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District 
interactions with MacDonald formed the basis of the solicitation prosecution. MacDonald, 2007 
WL 43635, at *l; McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 755. The other two incidents involved a different minor 
female, who was sixteen years old. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 755. MacDonald was forty-five at the 
time of the first incident with this sixteen year-old and forty-six at the time of the second. Id. 
26. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 
(1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
27. Id. at 757 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
28. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
29. 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005). 
30. McDonald, 630 S.E.2d at 757-58 (quoting Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Martin, 607 S.E.2d at 371 ("[A]pplying the reasoning of 
Lawrence . .. leads us to conclude that [the fornication statute] is unconstitutional because by 
subjecting certain private sexual conduct between two consenting adults to criminal penalties it 
infringes on the rights of adults to 'engage in ... the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process 
Clause .... "' (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564)). 
31. Id. at 758 (citing Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)). 
32. Id. (citing decisions from appellate courts in North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington); see 
also id. at 757 (citing United States v. Bach, 400 F.3d 622, 629 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that child 
pornography was not protected under Lawrence); United States v. Sherr, 400 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 
(D. Md. 2005) (adopting the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Bach); State v. Senters, 699 N.W.2d 810, 
817 (Neb. 2005) (holding that Lawrence does not apply to children and that states may define the 
age of majority). 
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Court for the Eastern District ofVirginia.33 As construed by the district court-
and as relevant to the ultimate disposition of the petition by the Fourth Circuit-
MacDonald claimed in his petition that section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code 
was unconstitutional on its face and as aq~lied in his prosecution.34 The district 
court disposed of the facial claim first. 5 The court reasoned that the state 
court's holding that MacDonald "lacked standing to challenge the facial 
constitutionality of ... [section] 18.2-361(A)" was not contrary to federal law 
because "the principle relied upon was drawn directly from a United States 
Supreme Court case."36 The district court next disposed of the as-applied 
claim,37 stating that because "Virginia considers persons aged sixteen and 
seventeen to be children, and the Supreme Court in Lawrence explicitly stated 
that the ruling did not apply to sexual acts involving children," the state court 
holding was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 38 
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION 
On appeal, a split panel of the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the case 
"for an award of habeas corpus relief on the ground that the anti-sodomy 
provision facially violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."39 Judge King wrote the opinion for the court, in which Judge 
Motz joined.40 Judge Diaz authored a dissent.41 
The panel majority first rejected the state court's reliance on the principle 
that a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only 
insofar as it affects the party's own rights.42 The court reasoned that this 
principle was inapplicable because the statute's facial unconstitutionality 
entailed its as-applied unconstitutionality. 43 
The Fourth Circuit majority described Lawrence v. Texas as holding that 
"statutes criminalizing private acts of consensual sodomy between adults are 
33. MacDonald v. Holder, No. 1:09cvl047(GBL/TRJ), 2011 WL 4498973, at *l (E.D. Va. 
Sept. 26, 2011), rev'd sub nom. MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013). 
34. Id. at *2. MacDonald also advanced an ex post facto claim and an insufficiency of the 
evidence claim. Id. 
35. Id. at *4. 
36. Id. at *5 (citing Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979)). The Supreme 
Court stated that "a party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute only insofar as it 
has an adverse impact on his own rights." Ulster Cnty. Court, 442 U.S. at 154-55. 
37. MacDonald,2011 WL4498973,at*5. 
38. Id. In evaluating the state court's ruling, the federal court applied the standard prescribed 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2102). Id. at *2. 
39. MacDonald v. Moose, 710F.3d154, 156 (4th Cir. 2013). 
40. Id. at 155. 
41. Id. at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
42. See id. at 161-62 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
43. Id. at 162 ("Because ... the anti-sodomy provision is unconstitutional when applied to 
any person, the state court of appeals and the district court were incorrect in deeming the anti-
sodomy provision to be constitutional as applied to MacDonald."). 
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inconsistent with the protections of liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment."44 The core of the panel majority's reasoning 
regarding the effect of Lawrence on Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) rested on 
its understanding of the Supreme Court's overruling of its earlier decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick.45 The panel majority explained Bowers as a failed facial 
challenge to a Georgia statute virtually identical to Virginia's;46 in concluding 
that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today," 
the Lawrence Court "recognized that the facial due process challenge in Bowers 
was wrongly decided."47 According to the majority, the similarities between the 
Georgia statute incorrectly upheld in Bowers and the Virginia statute underlying 
MacDonald's conviction required a holding of facial unconstitutionality in 
MacDonald's case: "Because the invalid Georgia statute in Bowers is materially 
indistinguishable from the anti-sodomy provision being challenged here, the 
latter provision likewise does not survive the Lawrence decision."48 
The court also reasoned that judicial narrowing of the sodomy prohibition to 
apply only to minors would require forbidden judicial rewriting of the statutes.49 
The majority acknowledged that a more narrowly drawn sodomy prohibition 
might be constitutional, but stated that the task of narrowing in these 
circumstances was for the state legislature, not a federal court. 50 Although the 
Supreme Court has stated that the preferred remedy is "to enjoin only the 
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications in 
force," this sort of remedy has a limit: courts should not rewrite state law even as 
they attempt to salvage it.51 The panel majority reasoned that "a judicial 
reformation of the anti-sodomy provision to criminalize MacDonald's conduct in 
this case, and to do so in harmony with Lawrence, requires a drastic action that 
runs afoul" of this principle.52 
Judge Diaz's dissent emphasized the deferential standard of review that a 
federal court must apply in reviewing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).53 The dissent opened with Judge Diaz's assessment that 
the state court's determination that Lawrence "invalidated sodomy laws only as 
applied to private consenting adults" was not "so lacking in justification that 
44. Id. at 163 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
45. Id. (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 574-75, 577-78; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 165. 
50. Id. ("The [Lawrence] Court's ruminations concerning the circumstances under which a 
state might permissibly outlaw sodomy, however, no doubt contemplated deliberate action by the 
people's representatives, rather than by the judiciary."). 
51. Id. at 166 (quoting Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood ofN. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328-
30 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. Id. at 165-66 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320). 
53. See id. at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012)). 
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there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 
any possibility for fairminded disagreement."54 The dissent next explained that 
the two grounds relied upon by the majority for rejecting an as-applied 
interpretation of Lawrence were unpersuasive.55 The majority's reliance on the 
overruling of Bowers, which the panel described as a failed facial challenge, was 
a "stretch."56 According to Judge Diaz, the court should not have assumed "that 
the Virginia General Assembly did not intend for its anti-sodomy provision to 
apply to the conduct that Lawrence arguably exempted from constitutional 
. ,,57 protect10n. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Judge Diaz's dissent was correct in its able elaboration of various ways in 
which the majority's analysis failed to abide by the deferential standard of 
review for federal habeas review of state court convictions.58 As he noted, the 
crux of the state court's reasoning in MacDonald's case was that "Lawrence did 
not facially invalidate all sodomy statutes, but rather only the ar plication of such 
statutes to private, consensual sexual activity among adults."5 This reading of 
Lawrence is correct because the Lawrence Court's discussion throughout is 
about the personal liberty interests of the adult petitioners in that case to engage 
in the private, consensual, noncommercial conduct at issue.60 But the question 
before the Fourth Circuit in MacDonald was not even whether the state court 
54. Id. at 167 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011)) (citing 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the majority 
did not explicitly acknowledge the dissent's formulation of the standard, this formulation correctly 
states the Supreme Court's binding doctrine interpreting the statutory standard ofreview. See, e.g., 
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87 ("As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 
court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling ... was so lacking in justification that 
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement."). 
55. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 168 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 169 ("If it is difficult to discern from the Lawrence opinion whether it invalidated 
all sodomy statutes, it is even more of a stretch to do so by negative inference from the case it 
overturned."). 
57. Id. at 171 (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 569). 
58. See id. at 167 (quoting Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012); 
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 160 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
59. Id. at 168 (footnote omitted). 
60. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (noting that the "case involves liberty of the person both in its 
spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions"); see id. at 564 ("We conclude the case should be 
resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as adults to engage in the private conduct 
in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution."); see also id. at 572 (observing that "liberty gives substantial protection to adult 
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex"); id. at 578 
(stating that petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to 
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government"). 
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reasoning was right, only whether it was reasonable.61 The applicable statutory 
standard of review required an inquiry into whether the state court decision 
"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States."62 Noting what he called "the opaque language of 
Lawrence," Judge Diaz observed that "[r]easonable jurists could disagree on 
whether Lawrence represented a facial or an as-applied invalidation of the Texas 
sodomy statute."63 And Judge Diaz's observation was plainly accurate.64 
Although Judge Diaz did not analyze the majority's discussion of facial 
versus as-applied invalidation in much depth, his principal observation on this 
point was devastating. Recall how the panel majority dealt with the Virginia 
court's application of the unremarkable rule that a litigant generally cannot bring 
a facial challenge against a statute that is constitutional as applied to that 
litigant.65 The panel majority said this was beside the point because the anti-
sodomy provision was unconstitutional as applied to MacDonald-a conclusion 
that followed from the panel majority's determination that the anti-sodomy 
provision was facially unconstitutional.66 As Judge Diaz pointed out, "this 
analysis is circular."67 
Judge Diaz went on to say that the standing-to-raise-a-facial-challenge 
principle did not matter in this case because the issue boiled down to the 
question "whether Lawrence invalidated sodomy statutes on an as-applied or 
facial basis."68 Although Judge Diaz was right about the limited consequences 
of the panel majority's circular reasoning for this particular case, that reasoning 
61. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 167 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (quoting Richardson v. Branker, 
668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l) (2012). 
63. MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 170 (Diaz, J., dissenting). Judge Diaz bolstered this observation 
by citing two circuit court decisions describing the Lawrence decision as a facial invalidation of the 
statute and two other circuit court decisions describing it as an as-applied invalidation of the statute. 
See id. (citing Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 8 n.4 (1st Cir. 
2012); Sylvester v. Fogley, 465 F.3d 851, 857 (8th Cir. 2006); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 812 
(7th Cir. 2005); D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
64. As this Author has explained elsewhere, the majority's description of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick as resolving a facial challenge is also incorrect. Kevin C. 
Walsh, The Fourth Circuit's Obviously (and Profoundly) Mistaken Habeas Grant Premised on the 
Alleged Facial Unconstitutionality of Virginia's "Anti-sodomy Provision," WALSHSLA w (Mar. 13, 
2013 ), http://walshslaw.wordpress.com/2013/03/13/the-fourth-circuits-obviously-and-profoundly-
mis taken-habeas-grant -premised-on-the-alleged-facial-unconstitutionality-of-virginias-anti-sodomy-
provi sion/ (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
65. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 161-62 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
66. Id. at 162 & n.11. 
67. Id. at 168 n.3 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. 
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nevertheless has the potential to cause confusion in future cases through its 
muddling of facial challenge doctrine.69 
To illustrate, consider the Fourth Circuit's decision in Woollard v. 
Gallagher,70 decided less than two weeks after MacDonald. In Woollard, the 
Fourth Circuit addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a Maryland gun-
permitting requirement that required an applicant to show a "good and 
substantial reason" to be able to carry a gun outside the applicant's home.71 The 
district court in Woollard held that this good-and-substantial-reason requirement 
was facially unconstitutional.72 But the Fourth Circuit approached it quite 
differently. In addition to rejecting Woollard's claim that the permitting 
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to him, the court held that Woollard 
lacked standing to bring his facial challenge: "Because we conclude that the 
good-and-substantial-reason requirement is constitutional under the Second 
Amendment as applied to Appellee Woollard, we also must reject the Appellees' 
facial challenge."73 According to the Fourth Circuit panel in Woollard, the 
Supreme Court has instructed that "a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the 
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in other 
situations not before the Court."74 
This principle is the same principle applied by the Virginia Court of Appeals 
in MacDonald's case.75 But the reasoning in the two Fourth Circuit cases is 
inconsistent.76 And the inconsistency cannot be attributed to one panel's 
unfamiliarity with the other panel's reasoning as the two cases made their way 
through the decisional process. Woollard and MacDonald were argued before 
the Fourth Circuit on the same day,77 and two out of the three judges presided in 
both cases: Judge King and Judge Diaz.78 Most importantly, Judge King 
authored both opinions. 79 
69. See id. (recognizing the majority's reasoning that because the law "is facially 
unconstitutional, it cannot be constitutional as applied to MacDonald"). 
70. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
71. Id. at 865, 868 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
72. Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 476 (D. Md. 2013), rev'd sub nom. Woollard 
v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
73. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882. 
74. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 
75. See MacDonald v. Commonwealth, Rec. No. 1939-05-2, 2007 WL 43635, *l (Va. Ct. 
App. Jan. 9, 2007); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) 
(quoting Ulster Cnty. Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55 (1979)) (citing Singson v. 
Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 686 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)). 
76. Compare Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882 (rejecting the appellee's facial constitutionality 
challenge because the statute was constitutional as-applied to the appellee), with MacDonald v. 
Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 161 (4th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (rejecting the principle that a litigant 
may not challenge the facial constitutionality of a statute that is constitutional as applied to him 
because the statute was facially unconstitutional). 
77. See Woollard, 712 F.3d 865; MacDonald, 710 F.3d 154. 
78. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155. 
79. See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155. 
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It is far from clear why the appellees in Woollard could not have made the 
same move endorsed by Judge King's panel majority opinion in MacDonald to 
seek an initial determination of facial unconstitutionality. 80 That is, after all, the 
determination the district court made in Woollard. 81 Based on MacDonald, the 
appellees in Woollard could have simply argued that advancing a facial 
challenge was one of their grounds for seeking as-applied relief. To point out 
the availability of this move is not to endorse it, of course, but rather to show that 
it was a mistake for the panel majority to make the move available in 
MacDonald. 
The MacDonald dissent's second principal criticism of the panel majority 
opinion-that the majority misapplied Ayotte-is also well-founded. 82 The 
dissent argued that a proper application of Ayotte would have permitted the 
continued enforceability of the anti-sodomy provision in circumstances not 
db L ' . 83 covere y awrence s reasonmg. 
Instead of treating section 18.2-361(A) of the Virginia Code as partially 
facially unconstitutional, the Fourth Circuit should have treated it as the Virginia 
courts did: unenforceable in those circumstances in which its enforcement would 
infringe on the personal liberty interests recognized in Lawrence, but otherwise 
enforceable. 84 
Apart from resting on its mistaken reading of Lawrence, the panel also 
reasoned that this "judicial reformation of the anti-sodomy provision" would be 
"a drastic action that runs afoul of the Supreme Court's decision inAyotte."85 In 
Ayotte, however, the Supreme Court directed that federal courts crafting 
remedies for partially unconstitutional statutes should generally try "to limit the 
solution to the problem," such as by "enjoin[ing] only the unconstitutional 
applications of a statute while leaving other applications in force."86 The Court 
did add that federal courts should not implement this general preference for 
limited relief when crafting such relief would require "making distinctions in a 
murky constitutional context, or where line-drawing is inherently complex."87 
And this is the part of Ayotte that the majority in MacDonald thought that 
anything other than partial facial invalidation would run afoul of. 88 But the 
80. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 162 n.11. 
81. See Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464 (D. Md. 2012). 
82. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 170-71 (Diaz, J., dissenting) (citing Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood ofN. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329-32 (2006)). 
83. Id. at 170-71 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329-32; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 569 
(2002)). 
84. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 757-58 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (citations 
omitted) (recognizing that Lawrence affords protection to adult, consensual, private, noncommercial 
sexual behavior, but not to sexual acts involving adults and minors). 
85. MacDonald, 710 F.3d. at 165-66 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. 320). 
86. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-29. 
87. Id. at 330 (citing United States v. Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 & n.26 
(1995)). 
88. See MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 166 (citing Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328-30). 
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majority was wrong because Lawrence was clear about the limits of its 
holding.89 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court identified four such limits: 
the protected conduct in Lawrence was (1) consensual, (2) noncommercial, (3) 
private, and ( 4) between two adults.90 The Virginia courts easily identified these 
limits after Lawrence, as did many other courts. 91 
These are also precisely the limits contained in a failed legislative fix for 
Lawrence in Virginia-a fix that may have failed because the bill also would 
have reduced the seriousness of the offense.92 Indeed, given Lawrence's clear 
statements about what that case did not involve, the Virginia legislature could 
have accomplished the same amendment of section 18.2-361(A) by simply 
appending a different proviso: "Provided, however, that this statute may not be 
enforced with respect to conduct constitutionally protected under Lawrence v. 
Texas." This shows at bottom what is wrong with MacDonald v. Moose. A 
proviso of this sort is already present by operation oflaw, even though the words 
do not appear in Virginia's statute books. When MacDonald was prosecuted, the 
applicable law included not only Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) but also 
Lawrence.93 The job of the court was not to figure out whether Lawrence 
required taking anything out of section 18.2-361(A), but rather, how to apply 
both that statute and Lawrence. 
To recognize that the superior law of the Constitution as set forth in 
Lawrence would limit the application of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A), it 
would not have been necessary for the judiciary to write words into the statute 
(actually or metaphorically). To see why, consider some other examples. A 
state statute does not have to recite that it is unenforceable in circumstances 
outside the state's legislative jurisdiction; the limits oflegislative jurisdiction are 
background rules of legislation. A legislature does not have to rewrite its long-
arm statute to specify that it does not apply to circumstances in which the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction under the statute would violate due process. 
89. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (stating that the case does not involve 
minors, acts of coercion, public conduct, or prostitution). 
90. Id. 
91. See, e.g., McDonald v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 754, 757 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) ("That 
[Lawrence's] holding does not apply to minors is one of four exceptions to the Court's holding. 
The Supreme Court found that acts involving minors along with non-consensual acts, public 
conduct, and prostitution do not merit due process protection." (citing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578)). 
92. See S.B. 477, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004), available at http://lis. 
virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?04 l +ful+SB477S1 (providing that the sodomy prohibition "shall 
not apply where all persons are consenting adults who are not in a public place and who are not 
aiding, abetting, procuring, engaging in or performing any act in furtherance of prostitution"); see 
also Kevin C. Walsh, A Closer Look at Virginia's 'Lawrence Fix' Shows Cuccinelli's Consistency 
and Fourth Circuit's Faulty Conclusion, WALSHSLAW (Aug. 13, 2013), http://walshslaw. 
wordpress.com/2013/08/ 13/a-closer-look-at-virginias-lawrence-fix-shows-cuccinellis-consistency-
and-fourth-circuits-faulty-conclusion/. 
93. Lawrence was decided in 2003, prior to MacDonald's arrest and conviction. See 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; MacDonald, 710 F.3d at 155. 
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And so on.94 Similarly, the Virginia legislature did not have to write into its 
statute that it would be unenforceable in circumstances in which its enforcement 
would violate the Constitution. That is a background rule of our legal system 
that operates of its own force. The panel majority's concerns about judicial 
rewriting in MacDonald v. Moose were simply misplaced. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Right or wrong, the panel majority's conv1ct10ns about the partial facial 
unconstitutionality of Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) carried the day. The 
Fourth Circuit denied rehearing en bane and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari. 95 While this additional federal appellate consideration was taking 
place, discussions about MacDonald v. Moose spilled over into the 2013 
Virginia gubernatorial campaign.96 A case that began as a straightforward 
appeal from the denial of habeas relief turned into a political beach ball batted 
around by both campaigns and a source of late night humor.97 With the 
campaign spectacles now but a memory, the principles of law formulated and 
applied in MacDonald v. Moose continue to govern in the Fourth Circuit. And 
that is why it remains worthwhile to subject the decision to careful criticism. 
The principles that matter the most, however, are not those specific to the 
interpretation and application of Lawrence v. Texas and Virginia Code section 
18.2-361(A). The fate of this one statutory provision under that one case is 
much less important than the understanding of judicial review that erroneously 
led to its partial facial invalidation. 
94. See Edward A. Hartnett, Facial and As-Applied Challenges to the Individual Mandate of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 745, 758-59 (2012) 
(explaining how a displacement-based understanding of judicial review can "pull us away from 
insisting that an inferior law recite and include the provisions of higher law, as opposed to simply 
giving way to the extent higher law itself governs"); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 778-80 (2010) (describing a displacement-based approach to judicial 
review in contrast with the reigning excision-based approach). 
95. Moose v. MacDonald, 134 S. Ct. 200 (2013) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
96. Ben Pershing, Cuccinelli Looks to Go on Offense over Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, July 
17,2013,atB3. 
97. See, e.g., id. ("When Virginia Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli II challenged a federal 
appeals court ruling that deemed the state's anti-sodomy law unconstitutional, Democrats pounced, 
accusing the Republicans of pursuing an anti-gay agenda. Now Cuccinelli's campaign for governor 
is looking to turn the tables .... "); see also The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Sodomy! Zygotes! 
Welfare! (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.thedailyshow.com/ 
watch/tue-april-9-2013/sodomy-zygotes-welfare-. 
